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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE IKSURANCE FUND,
administered by the Commission of
Finance of Utah,
Petiti-oner and Plaintiff,

No. 7274

vs.
ELBERT I. LUNNEN and THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
STATEMENT
Elbert I. Lunnen worked as a blacksmith and welder
for Lundin & May Foundry and Machine Company in
Salt Lake City, Utah, for a period of 22 years, from
,January, 1926, to February 7, 1948. During most of that
tiine he was exposed to the smoke and fumes which ca~e
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from the fluxes and welding rods which were used in
the "\velding processes. During the last 5 or 6 years of
his work he noticed a difficulty in breathing, and he
mentioned it several times to his employer. He found
it necessary to lay off work for short periods of ~time,
particularly after he had been welding on bronze. Finally his condition become so bad that he could not work
any longer; so he quit working on February 8, 1948, and
has not been able to work since that date.
On August 5, 1948, Mr. Lunnen filed a written applicatioi_l for compensation with the Industrial Commission
in which he specified that he had received injuries by
inhaling the fumes, sn1oke an~ gases from the fluxes
and welding rods and the coke used in the forge. This
application was made on a form which the Industrial
Commission uses in _accidental injury cases; so Mr. Lunnen later filed his elaim with the Industrial Commission
on Septe1nber 18, 1948, on an occupational disease clain1
forin.
The Industrial Commission held a hearing on October 6, 1948, and rendered i~ts decision on November
8, 1948, awarding compensation benefits to Mr. Lunnen
under the Occupational Disease Law. The State Insurance Fund, the employer's worlanen's compensation and
occupational disease insurance carrier, filed a timely
application for rehearing, which the Industrial Commission denied on Nove1nber 18, 1948. The_ State Insurance
Fund, which is administered by ~the Commission of Fina!lce, has brought· the ·case to the Supreme Court of
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Utah for revie,v. In this brief "~e shall refer to the reporter's transcript of the evidence as Tr.
QUESTION FOR REVIEW
The question of most importance in this case is
"~hether :ftir. Lunnen filed his written application with
the Industrial Con11nission ·w·ithin the required time
specified in the Occupational Disease Law.
ARGUMENT

.

,,. . e shall assume, for the purpose of this discus~ion,
that ~Ir. Lunnen established by competent evidence that
he becan1e totally disabled as ~the result of several years'
exposure to poisonous and irritating smoke and fumes in
his ,,~ork at the Lundin & May plant.
.

POINT 1
~IR.

LUNNEN'S APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION \VAS NOT FILED WITH THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WITHIN THE REQUIRED
PERIOD OF TIME AND WAS THEREFORE LEGALLY BARRED.
Section 42-la-49 of the Occupational Disease Law
provides:
The right to compensation under this act for
disability or death fron1 an occupational disease
shall be forever barred unless written claim is
filed with the commission within the time as in
this seeti~on hereinafter provided:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(a) If the claim is made by an employee
and based upon silicosis it must be filed within
one year after the cause of action arises.
(b) If the claim is made by an employee
and based upon a disease other than silicosis it
must he filed within sixty days after ~the cause
of action arises, except in case of benzol or its
derivities when it must be filed within ninety
days.
(c) (This subsection relates to death cases.)
Mr. Lunnen's claim, after it was amended by his
attorney, (Tr. 2 & 3), was undisputably based upon an
occupational disease other :than silicosis, ·and· therefore
comes within the provisions of the statutory limitation
of subsection (b) above-quoted. The disputed point in
this case involves the question, ''When does a cause of
action arise in an occupational disease case~''
We might be willing to concede that Mr. Lunnen's
first application of August 5, 1948, should be considered
a proper written claim filed with the Industrial Commission, even _though it was on a different form than is
customarily used in occupational disease ·cases. But that
would not help him any. August 5, 1948, is almost six
months after the day Mr. Lunnen's total disability ·commenced on February 8, 1948. He was required to file
his claim within 60 days after his cause of action arose.
Among other things, ~the Industrial Commission's
decision contained the following findings:

*

*

*

*
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"he 'Yas expo~ed during this period to harmful
quantities of poisonous fu1nes containing phosphorus. 1nanganese. rhloride and rhrome; that on
February 8, 1948, he quit his job because he "vas
physirally unable to ''"ork; that he consulted doctors Bauerline and Hatch 'vho advised him to
quit 'York and go to Arizona; that no complete
diag·nosis 'Yas made at this time ~to the applicant;
that the applicant became dissatisfied with the
prog-ress made in his recovery and on July 9,
1948, went to see Dr. Vernon Stevenson. Following a complete physical examination of the applicant and the x-rays taken of ~the applicant, Dr.
Stevenson found on July 28, 1948, that the applicant was totally disabled as a result of exposure
to poisonous fumes arising out of or in the course
of his employment; that the cause of aetion in
this case arose on July 28, 1948, when a complete
diagnosis was made by Dr. Vern on Stevenson of
this case and a finding was made; that applicant
was physically unable to continue his work because of this occupational disease he had incurred
due to his exposure to poison fumes during his
employment from January, 1926, Ito February,
1948, by Lundin and May Foundry and Machine
Company; that the applicant filed a claim for
compensation with the Industrial Commission on
September 18, 1948, and is within the statute of
limitations for filing his claim.''
The Commission's finding, or conclusion, that Mr.
Lunnen's cause of action arose on July 28, 1948, was
the basic error in the Commission's decision.
It is our contention that Mr. Lunnen's cause of action arose on February 8, 1948, the date when he became
totally disabled, and since \vhich date he has been continuously totally disabled.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

No occupational disease case has ever come to the
Supreme Court of Utah prior to this, in which was involved a question relating to when the cause of action
arose, so far as we are aware. Neither have we been
able to find any occupational disease case from any
other s~tate which involved the exact wording of the
Statute of Limitations contained in Section 49 of the
Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law.
When this matter was pending before the Industrial
Commission a Memorandum of Authorities was submitted by Mr. Lunnen's attorney at that time. He likewise
apparently was unable to find any case which involved
a Statute of Limitations containing the same wording
as that found in our Occupational Disease Law.
What are the necessary elements which give an employee a "·cause of action" under the Utah Occupati,onal
Disease Daw~ They are enumerated in Section. 42-la-13,
as follows:
(a) There is imposed upon every employer
a liability for the payment of compensation to
every employee who becomes totally disabled by
reason of an occupational disease subject to the
following conditions :
(1) No compensation shall be paid 'vhen the
last day of injurious exposure of the employee to
the hazards of said occupational diseases shall
have occurred prior to the effective date of this
act.
· (2) No compensation shall be paid for a
disea.-se other than silicosis unless total disability
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results within one hundred t"~enty days from the
last day upon "~hich the employee actually worked
for the en1ployer against "rhon1 con1pensation is.
claiined.
( 3) (This subsection relates to silicosis
'vhich is not here involved.)
(4) No claim shall be maintained nor compensation paid unless the claint has been filed
'Yith the co1n1nission in 'vriting within the time
fLxed by the appropriate subdivision of Section
49 of this act.
(The rest of the Section relates to death
cases.)
Applying all these provisions to Mr. Lunnen's claim:
First, he must have had exposure to harmful substances in the 'vork done for his employer in the period
bet\Yeen July 1, 1941, and February 7, 1948.
~ext,

he must have become totally disabled as the
result of that exposure and such total disability must
have connne:r:tced within 120 days after February 7, 1948,
'Yhich \Yas the last day of such exposure. In other words,
his total disability must have commenced on or before
June 6, 1948.
Next, he n1ust have filed his written claim with the
Industrial Commission within 60 days after his cause of
action arose.
\V"i th respect to the exposure, the evidence in the
record is ample to satisfy that requirement. vVith re~pect to the time when his total disability commenced,
\V€>, have already stated that the record sho,vs Mr. Lunnen
h<'eatne totallly disabled February 8, 1948. Inasn1uch as
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his attorney has filed an Answer to our Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, in which Answer he alleges that the record
does not establish whether Mr. Lunnen \vas totally disabled on February 8, 1948, or at some later date, we
shall quote a few portions of ~the testimony given by
Mr. Lunnen, himself. In both of his applications Mr.
Lunnen stated that he left \Vork on February 8, 1948,
and that he continued to be totally disabled from that
day until the date he filed each application. Then in
his testimony (Tr. 9 & 10) he stated that the smoke and
fun1es which were given off during welding operations
were so unpleasant and irritating that he was unable
to stay \Yith it for more than half an hour at a time and
that he had complained to his employer about this condition several times during the 4 or 5 years previous to
his quitting \Vork. At Tr. 10 he testified as follows:

Q. What brought you to make that complaint~

A. Well, on a particular bronze job, I had
to do an acetylene b~onze job, and I told the boss
at the time that it was getting too much for me.
Q. Was there anything in your physical condition that made you arrive at that conclusion~
A. Just your lungs, you get so you can taste
it in your food at night.
Q. That was about four or five years ago
you made that complaint~
A. Yes.
Q. I will ask you whether you have noticed
any difficulty in breathing, and whether you did
at that time.
A. This was coming on for five or six years,
difficulty in breathing.
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Q. ''Then you noticed this difficulty in
breathing. you con1plained to your Pinployer 1
~-\. I ha Ye told thPn1 tiine and again.
Q. I "·ill ask y ~1u \Yhether or not in the last
fe\Y ytlnrs it has been· necessary for you to lay
off \York for short periods of tin1e )?
:\.

Yes.

Q.

,,~hat

period J?
.1.\. EYery time I w'ould "·eld on bronz_e I
,,~ould haYe to lay off three to eight days.
He further testified that after he quit \vorking February 8, 1948, he consulted Drs. Bauerline and Hatch,
\Yho told him to quit his \York and go to Arizona. He
then went to the office of the Industrial Commission
w·here he \Yas supplied \Yith certain forms, one set of
them yellow and the other set white. (Tr. 11, 12, 29 & 30.)
He took the yellow forms to the office of Drs. Bauerline
and Hatch, but kept the white forms at his home. Apparently the white forms were the blanks upon which
he could have made his claim to the Industrial Conlmission, although that was not clearly brought out in
the hearing. On the back of the form filed by him on
Septen1ber 18, 1948, he stated "I was forced to quit
work on February 8, 1948, because of my illness." He
also testified, ( Tr. 29) :

Q. You say you went to Doctors Hatch and
Bauerline in February, 1948~
A. Yes.
Q. What was the purpose of going there~
A. To find out about my lungs.
Q. They were giving you trouble at that
time~
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A. Yes, that is ~the reason I quit work altogether. .
Q. The condition of your lungs made is necessary for you to quit work February 8, 1948~
A. Yes.
and at (Tr. 30):
A. In there they handed me two different
papers, and I took one set of papers home.
Q. What did it say on them~
A. I don't know. I took the three yellow'
ones up to the clinic but they never filled them
out.
MR. RAMPTON: That was to Dr. Bauerline~

A. Yes.
Q. Did Doctor Bauerline tell you why~
A. He told me that I had to stay out of that.
Q. You w.ere aware at that time that your
disability was probably caused by your employment~

A.

Yes, I had known it for a long while.
*
*
*
*
\Vhat -did Dr. Bauerline tell you was the

Q.
cause of it'
A. Dr. Bauerline said it vvas caused over a
period of years and the condition of ~the place
where I worked.
In Mr. Lunnen's attorney's Men1orandum filed with
the Industrial Commission, he argued that the 60-day
Statute of Limitations should not commence to run in
this case until Mr. Lunnen was informed by Dr. Stevenson on July 28, 1948, that his disability was caused
fro1n injury to his lungs and diaphram, which Dr.
Corey's x-ray and Dr. Stevenson's diagnosis determined
were the results of inhalation of gases from the welding

'
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operations 0ontaining phosphorus, manganese, chloride
and chro1ne. The Industrial Commission apparently accepted that theory as the basis for i~ts finding and conclusion that Mr. Lunnen 's cause of action arose within
the required statutory period prior to the time he filed
his claim. The Industrial Conunission 's decision, however, did not explain the date upon which !tlr. Lunnen's
cause of action arose. The evidence we have quoted
clearly showed that he knew that the gases and fumes
and smoke from the welding operations at his employer's
plant were causing him to have lung difficulty and other
physical troubles for several years prior to the date
when he finally quit work; and he also knew that these
lung troubles and other physical difficulties were the
cause of his inability to further continue his work.
On the general subject of when does a cause of action arise, we briefly quote the following :

34 American Jurisprudence, p. 92, §113:
It may be stated as a sound general proposition that a cause of action accrues the moment the
right to commence an action comes into existence,
and the statute of limitations commences to run
f~om that time even though, in some jurisdictions,
the party is ignorant as to the existence of his
rights or the cause of action is fraudulently concealed. As the rule is otherwise expressed, a right
of action accrues whenever such a breach of duty
or ·contract has occurred, or such a wrong has
been sustained, as will give a right to bring and
sustain a suit. Conversely, ~the right to eommence
an action arises the moment the cause of action
accrues. In the absence of a statute to the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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itrary, the test in each ~ase is wh~the; the pa:ty
asserting a claim is entitled to maintain an achon
to enforce it, for no limitation commences to run
against any demand until ~the obligation or denland is due and payable, in the sense that it is
defined sufficiently to be capable of enforcement.
(See Last Chance Ranch Co. vs. Erickson,
25 Pac. (2nd) 952, 82 Utah 475.)
86 A. L. R. 574:
The decision that the statute begins to run
only when the disease culminates in actual disability is also strongly supported by other cases
not turning upon that point, but holding, like
Johnson's Case ( 1914) 217 Mass. 388, 104 N. E.
735, 4NCCCA 843, and Bergeron's Case (1923)
243 Ma$S. 366, 137 N. E. 739, that injury to a
workman who had for years been gradually absorbing a poison into his system while working,
but did not quit work until it 1nade him so sick
that he had to stop, V\ras not received until he
finally quit.
54 Corpus Juris Secundum, pages 11 & 12,
§109:
A cause or right of action accrues, so as to
start the Staute of Limitations running, when
the right to institute and maintain a suit arises,
and not before.
* * * whenever one person may sue another a cause of action has accrued and the Statute of Limitations begins to run * * *.
The running of the statute, however, is not
delayed until plaintiff can secure sufficient evidence to maintain his aoti·on.
On February 8, 1948, Mr. Lunnen was entitled to
claim occupational disease compensation against his
employer and its insurance carrier. Before that date
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he did not have any cause of action (right to file a claim),
against his en1ployer and its insurance c.arrier. February
8, 1948, "Tas the first day on \Yhich all the necessary
elements of an occupational disease case \Yere in existence and upon the basis of "Thieh Lunnen could have
legally filed a clain1. Consequently, February 8, 1948,
was the day \Yhen his case of action ''accrued'' or
''arose,'' both of "\vhich \Yords mean the same thing
insofar as they relate to a cause of action.
\Vhile the \\Torkmen's Compensation Law of U:tah
contains an entirely different Statute of Limitations
than that contained in the Occupational Disease Law,
(and the \\Torkmen's Compensation Law always did have
a differently worded Statute of Limitations than the
Occupational Disea.se Law), there is one case which was
decided by the Supreme Court of Utah relating to a
workman's compensation ·claim which conitains a statement of basic rules relating to the Statute of Limitations
which may be helpful to the Court in its consideration
of the case at bar. We refer ~to Salt Lake 'C'ity vs. Industr·ial Commission, 74 Pac. (2nd) 657, 93 Utah 510. That
case involved a situation which arose prior to the Legislature's enactment of the present three-year Statute ~f
Limitations found in the last sentence of Section 43-1-92
of the Workmen's Compensation Law. We quote from
93 Urtah, page 513 :
"The (Workmen's) Compensation Act, Rev.
St. 1933, 42-1-1 et seq. imposes a duty on employers to pay compensation to employees who
suffer disability from an injury by accident arisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing out of or in the course of the employment.
Not until there is an accident and injury and a
disability or loss from the injury does the duty
to pay arise. A mere accident does not impose the
duty to pay. Accident plus injury therefrom does
not ilnpose the duty. But accident plus injury
\Yhieh results in disability or loss gives rise to
the duty to pay."
It also could appropriately be said that the Occupational Disease Law requires payn1ent of compensation benefits when there has been necessary exposure to
the harn1ful substances, plus injury to the employee
resulting from tha;t exposure, plus disability resulting
fron1 8aid injury; \Vith the existence of all three of
those elen1ents, the employee becomes entitled to make
a claim for occupational disease con1pensation benefits.
The Utah Occupational Disease Law does not contain any provision relating to the employee using diligence in obtaining a thorough medical diagnosis of his
case, o·r learning the technical medical name of the particular disease which disables him, or obtaining ·the
necessary medical evidence which he migh need to establish his claim. But rthe Occupational Disease Law
does contain an absolute limitation of the time within
which he n1ust file his written claim with the Industrial
Con1mission in order for him to be entitled to the ~ene
fits provided by the La-\v.
The case of Cleveland vs. Laclede Christy Clay
Products Company, 129 S. W. (2nd) 12, -"\vhich was decided by the Missouri Court of Appeals in 1939, involved
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the Statute of Linritations applicable to a claim for
disability from silicosis. The Missouri workmen's compensation la",. covers both accidental injuries and occupational diseases, and in that respect differs fron1 Utah's
statutes, in "\vhich the occupational disease law is a separate act. Ho,vever, this case has considerable similarity
to the case at bar, even though they involve different
occupational diseases. The Missouri Court said:
"It is claimed by counsel for the claimant
that his co-ndition was first discovered on J anuary 7, 1937, follo,ving an x-ray examination on
January 3, 1937. This was ~the date his physician
informed him of the name of the disease from
which he "'"as suffering, to wit: "silicosis." It is
urged that this information was the first knowledge he had that he was suffering from an occupational disease, and it is further urged that he,
because of learning the ·name of his lung trouble,
filed his claim \vith the \\T orkmen 's Compensation
Commission on January 28, 1937. Dr. Weinel, his
physician had been treating him for the chest
trouble for a long period of time, and \vhat claimant knew prior to January 7, 1937, about his
chest trouble was not added to by Dr. Weinel on
that date by giving him the specific nan1e of
''silicosis'' as the disease from which he suffered.
The greatest poet has said, "What is in a name~
That which we call a rose, by any other name
would smell as sweet.'' It cannot be seriously considered that his chest condition had materially
changed immediately upon his knowledge of the
name of ~the disease as gained from his physician.
There is nothing in the Workmen's Comp~nsation
Law indicating that the six months' statute of
limitation does not begin to run until such time
1
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as the employee may be ·told the technical name
of his illness. (Cases cited.) According to his
own testimony, claimant knew more than six
n1onths prior to the filing of his claim, that he had
this trouble in his chest and that he had been
trea~ted for it. He knew that the chest trouble
\vas the cause of his inability to do his full ·work
and that the nature of the \\·ork aggravated this
condition.

*

*

*

*

It is set out in 37 Corpus Juris, p. 969, as
follo,vs : '' * * * mere ignorance of the facts
\vhich constitute the cause of action will not postpone the operation of the statute of limitations,
but the statute will run from the time the cause
of action first accrues notwithstanding such ignorance.''
In the case of Universal Granite Qua:rries Co. vs.
Ind. C'omm., 272 N. W. 863, 224 Wis. 680:
''It is quite true the claimant knew nothing
about silicosis, but he kne"'\\r about stone dust and
thought that was the -cause of his difficulty. He
did not understand fully the physiological action
of stone dust in 1930 and 1931, he probably does
not understand it yet, but he knew that s~tone dust
was causing his trouble and must have known that
stone dust was connected with his employment
for he had worked for 40 years at the same kind
of work. * * * Failing ~to make claim for
compensation within two years from the time
when he became aware of his condition and the
cause of it, his claim is barred. ''
In the case of Brown vs. St. Joseph Lead Co., 87
Pac. (2nd) 1000, 60 Idaho 39, the Court's opinio~ holds
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that the accident sustained by a lode mine employee who
contracted silicosis was completed 'vhen the disease became so bad that the employee was forced to cease working, and the one-year period "~ithin 'vhich claim for compensation 1nust be filed under the \Vorkmen 's Compensation Act began to run from such date. The reason this
case comes under the \V orkmen 's Compensation Act is
because Idaho's act covers both accidental injuries and
occupational diseases.
In both the case of Agostin vs. Pittsburgh Steel
Foundry Corp., 47 Atl. (2nd) 680, 354 Pa. 543, and in
Stewart vs. Lakey Foundry & Machine Co.., 18 N. W.
(2nd) 895, 311 Mich. 463, it was held that ~the right to
compensation for disability from exposure to silica dust
commenced when the employee quit working and that
was the date of his total disability.
We are willing to admi~t that the 60-day or the 90day limitation periods provided by the terms of Section
42-1a-49, appear to be somewhat inadequate in certain
circumstances. We. do not know why the Legislature
provided a limitation period of one year within which
an employee might file a claim with the Industrial Commission based upon silicosis and in the same section
of the Law provided only a 60-day limitation period in
cases such as that of Mr. Lunnen's and a 90-day period in
claims involving disability from exposure to benzol or its
derivitives. Regardless of what reasons the Legislature
had in providing those par~ticular limitation periods for
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those particular types of cases, we are boun·d by the Legislative enactment. There p-robably are several provisions
of the Occupational Disease Law which the Legislature
should amend and which we would be willing to discuss
and recommend before the proper tribunal, namely the
Legislature or some of its committees.
~[r.

Lunnen's physical and financial condition are
such as to merit considerable sympathy and generosity.
However, the Supreme Court of U tab many years ago
declared that none of the officials charged with the adnlinistration of the State Insurance Fund has any legal
po,ver or authority to waive the Statute of Limitations
or any other valid defense which the Fund may have.
in a compensati_on case.

Taslich vs. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah·
33, 262 Pac. 281.
Spring Canyon Coal Co. vs. Industrial Comr
mission, 58 Utah 608, 201 Pac. 173.

For the foregoing reasons the award of the Industrial Commission should be annulled.
Respectfully submitted,
F. A. TROTTIER,
Attorney for Plaintiff.
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